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tHE fLoREntInE ARMy In tHE AGE of tHE 
CoMpAnIES of ADvEntuRE





The essay explores the recruitment and composition of the Florentine army in 
the fourteenth century. It stresses the importance of native troops and continuity 
of service among mercenaries in an era associated with free companies and 
organizational chaos. The Florentine army was, in contrast to the current litera-
ture, not an ad hoc and temporary entity but the product of careful considera-
tion and coordination. 
keywords: Companies of Adventure, Continuity, Native Infantry, Rural Lords, 
Lance Unit.
RESuMEn
Este artículo explora el reclutamiento y composición del ejército florentino en 
el siglo XIV. Subraya la importancia del uso de tropas nativas y de la continui-
dad del servicio entre los mercenarios, en una era asociada a las compañías 
“libres” de mercenarios y al caos organizativo. El ejército florentino fue, en 
contraste con la literatura actual, no una entidad temporal y creada ad hoc 
para un momento concreto, sino el producto de una cuidadosa preparación y 
coordinación.




L’exèrcit de florència al temps de les companyies de mercenaris
Aquest article explora el reclutament i composició de l’exèrcit florentí al segle 
XIV. Subratlla la importància de l’ús de tropes natives i de la continuïtat del 
servei entre els mercenaris, en una era associada a les companyies “lliures” 
de mercenaris i al caos organitzatiu. L’exèrcit florentí va ser, en contrast amb 
la literatura actual, no una entitat temporal i creada ad hoc per a un moment 
concret, sinó el producte d’una acurada preparació i coordinació.
paraules clau: companyies mercenàries, continuïtat, infanteria nativa, se-
nyors rurals, llança.
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The recruitment and composition of armies in fourteenth century Italy are 
among the most vexing and misunderstood aspects of medieval warfare. 
Such scholarship as there has been emphasizes the reliance of states on 
mercenary troops and the advent in the trecento of compagnie di ventura –
companies of adventure–, bands of mercenaries from Italy and elsewhere in 
Europe, who overwhelmed the native component of armies and undertook 
raids in times of peace. The companies have served as the symbol of the 
loss of communal fighting spirit and with it the moral degeneracy of Italian 
states. What has been forgotten in this construct is the realities of warfare 
and the actual nature of Italian armies. How were soldiers recruited, what 
did armies look like and how were they deployed in the field? 
The current scholarly consensus speaks of a “devolution” of military orga-
nization. In the thirteenth century, states relied primarily on native forces, 
reflecting a vigorous “communal martial spirit.” In the fourteenth centu-
ry, states came to rely more on mercenaries, arrayed often in pre-formed 
bands. By the fifteenth century, the bands became replaced by powerful 
individual condottieri, who in several well-known cases took over the states 
they served.1 This last phase is a main theme of Jacob Burckhardt’s seminal 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Burckhardt saw in the condottieri the 
type of calculated self-interest and “unbridled egotism” that was representa-
tive of the Renaissance as a whole. 
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This portrait of Italian warfare bears the stamp of Niccolò Machiavelli, who 
depicted “lazy” “useless” mercenaries as the ruination of Italy and blamed 
them and the states who hired them for the foreign subjugation of the pen-
insula in the fifteenth century. The present essay examines the Florentine 
army during the era of the companies of adventure. The period was chosen 
because the Florentine army has been judged by scholars as “retrograde” 
and “backward” even with respect its counterparts in Venice and Milan. 
Florence stands accused not only of relying on mercenaries, but of hiring 
men on short-term contracts and dismissing them wholescale from service 
at the end of “the campaigning season.” Florence did this while Venice 
and Milan began hiring its mercenaries on longer-term contracts, promoting 
continuity in the ranks, and more generally encouraging permanent forces 
that remained under contract even in times of peace.2 Florentine forces were 
ad hoc.  
The dated scholarly consensus requires revision. Indeed, close archival study 
reveals (unsurprisingly) that Florence devoted much attention to its army. It 
relied on mercenaries, but it chose the men with care and maintained long-
term relationships with them despite short-term contracts. Florentine officials 
recruited mercenaries alongside rural feudal lords, who played an import-
ant and often overlooked role in warfare. In addition, Florence maintained 
a substantial infantry force, much of which was recruited from its contado 
and subject communes and was far more professionalized than has been 
portrayed. Finally, any evaluation of Florence’s army must be understood 
in terms of the city-leagues or taglie that the city joined during this era. The 
leagues were enacted by participants (often neighboring cities) to provide a 
share (taglia) of troops for joint armies for the purposes of mutual protection 
in times of external threat. They were so frequent that it is difficult to find 
a single year for which Florence was not involved in one. Thus, it was the 
case, to paraphrase Daniel Waley for the first years of the trecento, that the 
Florentine army was as much an expression of “regional military policy” as 
it was an expression of the city’s own civic power. 
I
Discussions about the Florentine army usually begin in the year 1250, when 
the city issued a code governing its composition. The code was the work of 
Florence’s first popular government, the so-called primo popolo. Giuseppe 
2 CAFERRO, W. (2008): “Continuity, Long-Term Service and Permanent Forces: A Reassessment 
of the Florentine Army in the Fourteenth Century”. The Journal of Modern History, nº 80, pp. 
219-220.
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Canestrini published the document in the nineteenth century and stressed 
how it reflected the “native nature” of the Florentine army.3 It revealed a 
Florentine army arranged in twenty compagnie recruited from the popolo of 
the city and leghe recruited from 96 pievi in the contado. A pieve consisted 
of a single town or several communities. All compagnie and leghe were led 
by captains, whose brigades were variable in size. Men between the ages 
of 15 and 70 who resided in the city (cittadini) and contado (contadini) 
were eligible to serve in the army. Magnates and Ghibellines (often the 
same) were expressly forbidden from participating because their loyalties 
were suspect.4 In times of civic unrest, the army assumed police functions. 
It protected government buildings and arrested exiles and other malfatori, 
who caused trouble. In times of war, the compagnie formed the cavalry 
core of the army. The vanguard of the army consisted of the so-called fedito-
ri, the striking force, followed by the infantry, who stood behind the cavalry. 
The route of armies out of Florence to the battlefield was carefully planned 
in conjunction with astrologers. Local shops were closed, city bells rang and 
the carroccio, a wheeled cart that was the symbol of the city, went forward 
under heavy guard. 
Daniel Waley has questioned the degree to which the military code of 
1250 reflected the true nature of Florentine forces. Waley sees it as part of 
a general institutional reorganization that involved also the transfer of the 
internal police duties of the force to civic officials. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of native troops in the Florentine army is clear. The famous libro di 
Montaperti gives important detail about an actual Florentine army deployed 
in the eponymous battle of 1260. Native Florentine cavalry numbered near-
ly 1400 men. The mercenary cavalry consisted of only 200 men, recruited 
primarily from the nearby Emilia and Romagna regions, just north of Flor-
ence. The infantry, believed to be more than 16,000 men, was recruited 
from the Florentine contado.5 Waley saw little trace of the deployment of 
urban compagnie in the battle and in subsequent armies. 
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5 WALEY, D. (1968): “The Army of the Florentine Republic from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth 
Century”. RUBINSTEIN, N. (ed.), Florentine Studies. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
pp. 76-78.
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The army at Montaperti was nevertheless an overwhelmingly Florentine one, 
and its calamitous defeat at the hands of Siena and its Ghibelline allies, 
who relied on German mercenary cavalrymen, gave impetus to change. 
After the battle, Florence began systematically to recruit mercenaries. This 
was aided by involvement in a series of Guelf Tuscan leagues, headed by 
the king of France’s brother, Charles of Anjou, who became ruler of Na-
ples and the kingdom of Sicily in 1266. Participation brought numerous 
French and Provencal mercenaries into Florentine service, including the dis-
tinguished captain Amauri of Narbonne.
For all the discussion of Montaperti as a turning point in Florentine military 
organization, the limited evidence also suggests that Florence continued 
to rely on native troops through the end of the thirteenth and beginning of 
the fourteenth century. A careful analysis by Cesare Paoli of the Florentine 
army assembled to fight against neighboring Pistoia in May of 1302 shows 
that the force consisted almost wholly of native cavalry and infantry.6 The 
composition of the army is listed in table 1.
Table 1. Composition of the Florentine Army, 1302
__________________________________________________________
 497 Cavalrymen from the city
 117 Crossbowmen from outside the city
 644 Crossbowmen and shield bearers from Florence
            3,961 Infantrymen from the contado and Florentine state 
 1058 Non-Florentine infantrymen
 972 Guastatori (Destroyers)
_______________________________________________________________      
The native element was clearly significant, and the army also had a consid-
erable number of infantrymen. The latter owed to the fact that the campaign 
against Pistoia involved besieging the city, which required infantrymen as 
well as contingents of guastatori or destroyers, who set fires, dug ditches 
and mined below fortifications. The guastatori were often country rustics 
6 PAOLI, C. (1867): “Rendiconto e approvazione di spese occorse nell’esercito fiorentine conto 
Pistoia nel Maggio MCCCII”. Archivio Storico Italiano, ser. 3 vol. 6, p. 7.
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with little training. But their contribution to war, especially during sieges, 
was important.7 
Paoli suggests that the army of 1302 also contained mercenaries who do 
not appear on the Florentine payroll, but most likely were supplied to the 
city by its allies. The judgment underscores a basic problem in evaluating 
armies of this and all periods: it is difficult to isolate a precise “Florentine 
army” from the bands of auxiliaries and additional troops sent by allies. 
Likewise, Florence’s participation in city-leagues (taglie), which required 
each adherent to provide a share of the troops for a joint army, further ob-
scures the line between what was specifically Florentine and what was not. 
The leagues were joined more frequently after Montaperti and the arrival 
in Italy of Charles of Anjou. Charles became the guiding force behind the 
Guelf cause and a champion of leagues, which continued after he died in 
1285.8 In his pioneering essay on the league (taglia) of 1281, Lamberto 
Naldini argued that the alliance, and those that immediately followed, gave 
impetus to the formation of a regional Tuscan economy, and, inasmuch 
participants recruited professional soldiers who stayed on the payroll over 
the long run, encouraged the dependence on mercenaries, which came at 
the expense of the “old feudal class” of native soldiers.9 Daniel Waley has 
claimed that the leagues were so important to Florentine military organiza-
tion that the local army can only be understood in regional “Guelf” rather 
civic terms.   
Waley is nevertheless too quick to dismiss the significance of the “Guelf” 
political label, just as Naldini is too hasty to announce the end of the feudal 
class. Florentine armies of the early trecento and subsequent years always 
contained soldiers from the feudal class of rural magnates who inhabited 
the Italian countryside. Moreover, however amorphous the label Guelf may 
appear to modern scholars, it had real meaning in its historical context. All 
Italian soldiers hired by Florence were specifically required to be “faithful 
Guelfs,” a stipulation written into their contracts. In addition, it is important 
to stress that Italian military and political history on the peninsula was not 
driven solely by the actions of major states such as Florence, Venice, Pisa, 
7 BIANCHI, S. A. (1995): “Gli eserciti delle signorie venete del Trecento fra continuità e trasfor-
mazione”. CASTAGNETTI, A. and VARANINI, G.M. (eds.), Il Veneto nel medioevo. Verona, 
Banca Popolare di Verona, p. 176.
8 WALEY, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, p. 80.
9  NALDINI, “La ‘tallia militum societatis tallie Tuscie’”, p. 77.
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Genoa and others. There were, throughout Italy, many independent feuda-
tories that pursued their own interests, alternately siding with their neighbors 
and against them. They chose sides in Guelf and Ghibelline rivalries and 
when they were not themselves at war, they hired themselves out to fight 
wars for others. The captains of the Guelf leagues included independent 
rural lords such as Ranuccio Farnese, from southern Tuscany, and Aghinolfo 
of Romena, from the mountains in the Casentino north of Florence. Mean-
while, Florence routinely recruited horsemen from Umbria, the Marches of 
Ancona and the Romagna. The service of members of lordly clans of these 
regions was remarkably enduring. The counts of Sarteanno in southern Tus-
cany, for example, worked both for and against Florence throughout the 
thirteenth and fourteenth century, as did members of the Tarlati clan from 
near Arezzo. The image of local lords turned into the great condottiere 
famously outlined by Jacob Burckhardt for the fifteenth century had its roots 
in the fourteenth. 
Florence’s wars against Castruccio Castracane, the powerful lord of Lucca, 
in the 1320s have been viewed by scholars as a point of no return in the 
transformation of communal armies. Castruccio posed a grave threat to 
Florence and the battles against him were especially bitter and protracted. 
Castruccio’s military might owed in large part to the support of the German 
emperor Ludwig of Bavaria, who supplied Castruccio with German merce-
naries for his cavalry. The men were effective at Altopascio in 1325, where 
Florence suffered a stunning defeat. After Altopascio, Florence began to 
recruit German cavalrymen in significant numbers. They replaced the large-
ly French and Catalan mercenaries that the city had employed during the 
years that Charles of Anjou was active in Italy. They had been ineffective 
and untrustworthy at Altopascio.10 
The aftermath of the battle of Altopascio represented the start of the so-called 
era of the companies of adventure (compagnie di ventura), who would play 
an important part in political and military affairs on the Italian peninsula 
until the end of the trecento. In 1337 Florentine issued a new code govern-
ing its army and reordering the office of the condotta that hired troops. The 
code coincided with the start of yet another war, this time against the della 
Scala lords of Verona. Florence sought an alliance with Venice, whose in-
terests were similarly threatened by the expansionist Scala state. The terms 
10 WALEY: “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, p. 106; CANESTRINI, “Documenti”, p. xxvi.
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were generally unfavorable to the Florentines, who sent money north to help 
the Venetians repel the Scala. But Venice did little to help Florence with the 
Scala threat in Tuscany, which centered on the nearby city of Lucca. 
C. C. Bayley interpreted the terms of the military code of 1337 as evidence 
of the “infiltration” of the “mercenary element” into Florentine armies.11 The 
point is, however, overstated. The code, which was the work of a committee 
of prominent citizens (Francesco Bilioti, Filippo Duccio Magalotti, Tomma-
so Dietiauti, Luca Gerini delle Strozzi, Benincasa Falchi and Aldobrando 
Lapi Tanaglie), encouraged the use of mercenaries, notably ultramontane 
soldiers (those from beyond the Alps), but native elements also remained.12 
City officials were permitted to hire 800 cavalrymen and 1000 infantrymen 
directly through the office of the condotta, but all additional hires needed 
the consent of the priori, gonfalonieri and twelve buonuomini, who formed 
the executive branch of the government.13 The hire of Florentine citizens, 
contadini and Italian soldiers required the specific approval of these same 
officials. No more than fifteen Italian cavalrymen were allowed to serve in 
units of twenty to fifty men. Ultramontane cavalry units consisted of 20 men. 
Soldiers received their pay at the beginning of each month. Foreign soldiers 
required a mallevedore to serve as surety for their service in case of fraud. 
All cavalry captains had to maintain a horse worth 50 florins, while caval-
rymen needed to have horses worth 30 florins. 
The code also contained important guidelines on how soldiers had to arm 
themselves for war and the penalties for failing to pass musted. Cavalry 
captains supplied their own horse, armor and weapons. These included a 
breastplate with iron sleeves, a steel helmet, a shield, lance and dagger. 
Failure to pass muster was punished by a fine. To this end, officials care-
fully listed the names of the troops and their equiptment. Muster was held 
two days after the payment of wages. Fines were deducted directly from 
soldiers’ pay. 
Florence arranged its armies primarily in banner units, described in the 
code as consisting of twenty to twenty-five men. This included both cavalry 
and infantry units, the basic divisions of the army. Florence hired men on 
contracts (condotte) ranging from four to six months long. The code says 
explicitly that troops could not serve for more than six months without addi-
tional approval. C. C. Bayley says that Florence’s preference for short-term 
11 BAYLEY, C. C. (1961): War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo 
Bruni. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, p. 15.
12 CANESTRINI, “Documenti”, p. 498.
13 CANESTRINI, “Documenti”, pp. 498, 501-502.
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contracts was based on the “fading assumption” that “war was brief.”14 
But this is not true. Florentine public officials chose short term contracts to 
avoid nepotism and circulate new people into these important jobs. This 
was true of civic jobs as well as military ones. The priori of the Signoria, 
the chief executives of the city, served two-month terms, members of the ad-
visory councils, the twelve buonuomini and sixteen gonfalonieri, held office 
for three and four months, respectively. The podestà, who helped maintain 
internal peace and defend against external enemies, served on a six-month 
contract. In the case of the army, the short-term contracts were related to 
quality and control, allowing city officials to routinely reassess its force and 
dismiss those soldiers who were lacking. 
Further proof of this is the evidence that those soldiers who served well were 
often rehired, despite their short-term contracts. Some men worked for Flor-
ence for long periods of time, including the restless and so-called “faithless” 
mercenaries. The German captain Gottfried Roher was, for example, hired 
by Florence in 1334 on a six-month contract. He remained in Florentine 
employ on similar contracts without interruption until 1354. In that year, he 
joined the famous free company of the Provencal adventurer Fra Moriale, 
which extorted a large bribe from Florence and other cities. 
Throughout the fourteenth century, Florence often rehired the same merce-
nary cavalry captains. The length of service stipulated in their contracts 
did not determine how long they actually served the city. The Italian mer-
cenary captain Nino di Dini degli Obizzi, a Guelf exile of Lucca, worked 
for Florence for a full sixteen years from 1347 to 1362. The German cap-
tains Edvard Bingher, Hans Dornich, and Heinrich Paer worked for Flor-
ence for at least a decade, always on four- to six-month contracts. Wilhelm 
Belmont stayed in the city’s employ for twelve consecutive years from 1343 
to 1354.15
Germans were the most numerous of the mercenaries in Florentine employ 
through the middle of the trecento. But the trend toward long-term employ-
ment on short-term contracts cut across national lines. Hungarian mercenar-
ies, whose numbers, like those of the English, were small, also worked for 
Florence for extended periods. Georgio Gregori, a Hungarian horseman, 
was on the payroll for thirteen consecutive years, on four-month contracts. 
14 BAYLEY, War and Society in Renaissance Florence, p. 9.
15 Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), camarlinghi uscita, 80, fols. 1r–32r compared with Provvi-
sioni, registri, 26, fol. 149v; Miscellanea Repubblicana, 119, fols. 11r–12v, 35r,44r; 120, 
fols. 2r, 12v, 18r; camarlinghi uscita, 6, fols. 1r–17v; 7, fol. 176r; scrivano di camera uscita, 
1, fols. 17r–25r. 
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Another Hungarian, Bachone di Giovanni, served for eleven consecutive 
years, from 1360 to 1370, also on four-month contracts. The English cap-
tain Oschino Archer worked for Florence for seven consecutive years. John-
ny Liverpool served the city for eight consecutive years on four, five and 
six-month contracts.
The career of the German captain Burchardt da Toro is especially notewor-
thy. He appears to have been hired by Florence in 1341, for the army sent 
against Pisa. He remained in Florentine employ through the rest of the de-
cade and was part of the feditori contingent that took on the Ubaldini clan 
in 1350. A year later, when the Milanese threatened the Florentine state, 
Burchardt was put in charge of all Florentine forces. His army guarded the 
northern passes into the Florentine state in the Mugello and took part in the 
heroic defense of the town of Scarperia, for which he received bonus pay. 
He was subsequently used as an ambassador and appears to have integrat-
ed himself into Florentine society.
The evidence makes clear that at the same time that Florence began to rely 
more on mercenaries, particularly foreign born ones, it also attempted to 
maintain a continuity of personnel. The city built its forces around a core of 
seasoned professionals. The portrait contradicts the current scholarly view 
that stresses the ad hoc and backward nature of Florentine forces. But there 
is no reason to assume that Florence, even in the era of mercenary compa-
nies, did not give careful thought to their army, which was so frequently in 
the field. 
Indeed, a careful examination of Florentine budgets shows that of the forty 
mercenary captains listed as serving in the army against Milan in May/June 
1351, twenty-two (55 percent) had previously worked for Florence, several 
for nearly a decade. The leadership of Florentine forces in September/
October 1369, on the eve of the battle of Cascina, consisted of ninety-four 
mercenary captains, sixty-three of whom (67 percent) had already worked 
for Florence for at least four years. The army deployed to fight the papacy 
in September/October 1376 contained forty-five mercenary captains, of 
whom thirty-three (73 percent) had worked previously for Florence, most for 
at least five years.16 
A more difficult task is assessing the role of infantry in Florentine armies. 
As we have seen, the number of such men was large in the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the chronicle sources, which 
often give precise (albeit suspect) figures for the cavalry, frequently describe 
16  CAFERRO, “Continuity, Long-Term Service and Permanent Forces”, p. 231.
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the infantry as a “mass of men.” The generic rendering is likely related to 
the lack of status of the men. But even so, we must take care not to make 
rash judgments. Indeed, Florentine budgets (beginning from 1343) suggest 
that Florence took care assembling its contingents of crossbowmen, shield 
bearers and mixed bands that contained both. The budgets provide the pro-
venience of the captains of these units and show that many, like their prede-
cessors of the earlier years, came from the Florentine contado, distretto and 
subject lands. The wealth of documents that survive for Florence’s conflict 
with the Ubaldini clan in 1350 show that the army sent by the city to the 
Apennine mountains in the Mugello region was composed of infantry cap-
tains from that area, and from mountain villages in the Garfagnana near 
Lucca and the mountains near above Pistoia. Florentine officials, in short, 
consciously recruited men adapted to the type of warfare (in the mountains) 
that it intended to wage.17  
Similarly, there is evidence among infantrymen of long-term service de-
spite short term contracts. The shield bearer captain Francesco Bartoli from 
Florence, known by the nickname “Malamama” (or “bad mother”), began 
working for communal armies in 1349 and continued to work for Florence 
until 1353. He appears again in the records from 1359 to 1370. The infan-
try captain Ottolino Casoli from Prato worked for the city continuously from 
1362 to 1378, while Iuntino Giuntini from Sarzana worked as a captain of 
crossbowmen units from 1365 to 1379.18 
There are many additional examples and much more work needs to be done 
and can be done with close inspection of extant budgets. But the evidence 
suggests that even the infantry, whose value is traditionally undervalued by 
scholars, was arranged with care and there was a measure of continuity in 
the ranks. The notion is not far-fetched, as the geography of Tuscany, with 
its many hills, necessitated siege rather than war of maneuver in the field.  
It is important to note that the continuity in Florentine armies occurred over 
diverse communal regimes and numerous wars. Gottfried Roher fought 
against the Scala at Lucca in 1338, against Pisa in 1341 and against Mi-
lan from 1351-1353. In the meantime, he survived the shift of government 
from the popolo to the duke of Athens in 1343 and the expulsion of the 
duke shortly thereafter. 
17 CAFERRO, W. (2013): “Petrarch’s War: Florentine Wages at the Time of the Black Death”. 
Speculum, nº 88/1, pp. 144-165.
18 CAFERRO, “Continuity, Long-Term Service and Permanent Forces”, pp. 233-234.
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II
The example of the Florentine army that fought against the Pisans in 1341 
reveals the increased influence of mercenary soldiers. The main striking 
force was now made up of 2,000 mercenaries, captained by an Italian 
knight, Matteo de Pontecarali. The citizen cavalry numbered no more than 
40 men, although it included members of the leading families of the city. 
The lack of a native element caught the attention of the chronicler Giovanni 
Villani, who questioned the wisdom of city officials for putting the fate of 
the commune in the hands of outsiders. The complaint must be understood, 
however, in terms of Villani’s bitterness at the eventual defeat of the Flo-
rentine force.19 Villani’s main objection was that the army had too many 
knights in it, such that the captain general had difficulty coordinating the 
men, who did not listen to him. Nevertheless, the army was arrayed in much 
the same way that it was when it took the field in 1337. The basic fighting 
unit remained the “banner,” consisting of twenty to twenty-five men. It was 
used both by the cavalry and infantry. The cavalry striking force or feditori 
was, as in the past, at the vanguard of the army, with the infantry behind it. 
Important and basic changes were nevertheless beginning to occur in Flo-
rentine armies. A turning point for Florence and all of Italy occurred with 
the arrival of the English White Company on the peninsula in 1361. The 
famous Company crossed the Alps from France to participate in war in the 
Piedmont region in the employ of the Marquis of Montferrat. The band, 
made up primarily of Englishmen but commanded by a German, created a 
sensation, owing to its cruel efficiency in battle. In the summer of 1363, with 
the help of the Visconti of Milan, the band took up employ with Pisa, which 
was at war with Florence. During the transfer, the band’s most notable mem-
ber, John Hawkwood, took over leadership of the company and with it the 
Pisan army. Under his command, Pisan forces gained the momentum in a 
war that had been a tedious and all-too-familiar contest of maneuver since 
it began in 1362. Florence responded to the White Company by hiring 
large bands of the German mercenaries, including those led by the southern 
German nobles Johann and Rudolf Hapsburg. 
The conflict marked the start of a new era in the reliance on mercenaries 
for Florence. The city now routinely sought the service of large organized 
companies of men rather than only small units.  It is important to stress this 
point, which suggests that the reliance on “companies” of mercenary men 
19 BAYLEY, War and Society in Renaissance Florence, p. 15.
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was not the result of a natural evolution or, better, “devolution” of merce-
nary service, as scholars have long suggested, but more the result of hap-
penstance and the concurrence of the Hundred Years War in France, which 
created such bands. Hawkwood and the Pisan army penetrated to the walls 
of Florence in 1364. The city saved itself by bribing the English company, 
as well as a German band captained by another notable mercenary, Han-
nekin Baumgarten. Hawkwood gained a reputation for honesty by being 
among the few soldiers who turned down the Florentines. He remained at 
the head of Pisan forces. 
After the war, Florence recruited large bands of mercenaries and frequent-
ly sought the services of John Hawkwood, who had emerged as the best 
commander of his generation. It is important to note, however, that Florence 
continued to hire small bands of mercenaries and to build its army from a 
small cadre of faithful, battle proven soldiers. It also continued to hire rural 
lords and exiles from enemy cities in its armies. They provided vital recon-
naissance, regardless of their qualities as men at arms.  
Changes in the organization of the Florentine army come into fuller view 
when the city fought its next major opponent, Milan, in 1369. As happened 
in 1337, Florentine officials issued a code governing its army at the outset 
of conflict. The code is notable for its stark difference from the earlier one. 
It included specific rules regarding a wide array of mercenary cavalrymen, 
including those of English, German, Burgundian, Italian and Hungarian back-
ground. The code of 1337 speaks only a generic terms of “mercenaries.” 
A close reading of the code of 1369 makes clear the primacy of English 
mercenaries above all others. They were the most desirable soldiers. Their 
contingents included the famed longbow archers that had performed so 
well in France. But the overall number of archers remained small in Italy, 
and they do not appear to have had a major impact in battles. The effect 
of the English is most apparent in the change from the use of banners as 
the basic cavalry unit to lances. The lance consisted of three men: a knight, 
a squire and a page, each with his own mount. The page was typically a 
young man or apprentice who rode a pony.20 According to the Florentine 
chronicler Filippo Villani, “it was the English who introduced this formation 
into Italy.”21 The Florentine infantry does not appear to have undergone a 
20 CAFERRO, W, (2006): John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth Century Italy. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, p. 88.
21 VILLANI, Filippo (1980): Cronica di Matteo e Filippo Villani, vol. 5. Rome, Multigrafica, p. 
258; CAFERRO, John Hawkwood, p. 88.
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similar transformation. The banner remained the standard unit among cross-
bowmen and shield bearers.
Much has been written about the lance. Geoffrey Chaucer’s “worthy knight” 
in the prologue to the Canterbury Tales belonged to a lance unit. In the 
battles of the Hundred Years War, the formation has been seen as facilitat-
ing the dismounting of cavalry that contributed to England’s great victories 
against French armies at Crecy and Poitiers. In Italy, the lance became 
the standard unit of organization for cavalry throughout the peninsula. The 
historian Stephan Seltzer has traced the shift from banners to lances in the 
armies of Perugia, Venice and the papacy in 1367/68 and in the armies of 
Milan and Modena in 1370.22 Thus whether inspired directly by the English 
or by the actions of other states, Florence’s change to lances coincided with 
broader military developments. 
The precise meaning of the shift to lances is nevertheless not entirely clear. 
Was the change primarily an administrative one or did it have tactical 
military meaning in its Italian context? Stephan Selzer emphasizes the lat-
ter, arguing that the lance encouraged in Italy the type of “dismounting” 
technique used by the English cavalry in the Hundred Years War.23 Paolo 
Grillo has more recently affirmed Selzer’s judgment, seeing the use of the 
lance as evidence of English influence on the methods of Italian war.24 The 
difficulty with the interpretation, however, is that it is not entirely clear how 
the banner unit that preceded the lance was deployed in the field, nor is it 
clear how many horses a captain had and how many ancillary personnel. 
The evidence relating to military practice in the field suggests that Florence 
rarely confronted an opponent directly, as occurred up north at the battles 
of Crecy and Poitiers. 
In any case, the shift by Florence to lances in 1369 appears to have oc-
curred by degrees, and prior to Florence’s active engagement with an en-
emy. In December 1367, the city hired its first lance unit. On 8 December 
1367, after two years of service at the head of a banner unit of cavalrymen, 
the English soldier Oschino Archer shifted to command a single “lance” 
unit. On that same day, Florence hired three additional Englishmen, Wil-
liam Bocoste, Edward Bertum and John of London, each at the head of a 
lance unit.25 Two days later, Florence hired fourteen more English captains 
22 SELZER, S. (2001): Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento. Tubingen, Niemeyer, pp. 56-57; 
CAFERRO, John Hawkwood, p. 88.
23 SELZER, Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento, pp. 56-57.
24 GRILLO, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, p. 154.
25 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 32 fols. 22v-23r. 
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in lance units, and then (11 December) eleven English captains, again in 
charge of single lance units.26 At the same time, however, the prominent 
English captain Richard Romsey continued in Florentine employ in charge of 
sixteen banners of cavalrymen, as did Thomas Corensie and John Aguillant, 
all of whom were hired in December 1367.27 Romsey continued to captain 
banner units into 1368.28
The hires reflect a general military build-up in Florence that winter owing to 
the growing hostilities with Pisa and Milan and worries about the possible 
descent into Italy of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV. There was like-
wise civic discord in nearby San Miniato al Tedesco, a Florentine satellite 
on the border with Pisa. Florence continued to hire banner units, but the 
preeminence of the lance unit became clear. In 1368, captains of multi-
lance units appear in Florentine service. The men were not only English, but 
also German, Italian, Burgundian and Gascon. Indeed, the Burgundians in 
Florentine employ appear to have been arrayed in lance units as early as 
the English, and just afterward. The largest lance unit in Florentine employ 
at the beginning of 1368 was a Burgundian one, led by Stefano di Santo 
Giovanni, who commanded 12 lances.29 Italian mercenaries, on the other 
hand, seem to have been slow in adopting the new unit, remaining mostly 
in banner contingents.30 
The change to lances did not involve Hungarian cavalrymen at all. They be-
came increasingly important to communal armies at this time. But unlike their 
German, Italian and English counterparts, Hungarian cavalrymen were also 
bowmen, who shot arrows from their mounts. They were arranged in their 
own units, usually consisting of twelve to fourteen men. It is unclear how the 
Hungarian units were integrated into the overall army. 
The documents in the Florentine state archive trace a significant military 
buildup in in the spring and summer of 1368. The advent of Charles IV in 
Italy in May 1368 caused confusion and fear throughout northern and cen-
tral Italy. When Charles entered Tuscany in September 1368, San Miniato 
rose up in rebellion against Florentine rule.31 In the meantime. Milanese 
26 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 32 fols. 23v-25v
27 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 32 fols. 30r-v
28 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 36 fol. 23r
29 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 37 fols. 40r, 42r
30 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 32 fols. 22r, 33v
31 STEFANI, M. di C. (1903): “Cronaca fiorentina”. RIDOLICO, N. (ed.), Rerum Italicarum Scrip-
tores, vol. 30, Part I. Città di Castello, S. Lapi, pp. 269-270.
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armies moved into Umbria by early 1369, trying to exploit unrest between 
Perugia and the papacy –the latter a long-time enemy of Milan.32 The pres-
ence of Milan in Umbria frightened Florentine officials, who allied with 
Pope Urban V in November 1369.
As military conflict became inevitable. Florence’s army continued to morph 
into a lance-based cavalry force. By 1369, all of its English cavalrymen were 
arranged in lance units, as were Breton, Gascon and German captains in 
communal service. Only Italian captains remained in banner units.33 Oschi-
no Archer now captained 12 lances.34 The Florentine politician Giovanni 
Corsi suggested that the city augment the army with “as many Englishmen 
as possible.”35 To this end, Florence tried to recruit John Hawkwood, who 
was captain of the Milanese army. Hawkwood was not interested. The city 
tried to woo members of his army, but also with little success.36 The city 
hired instead more German, Gascon and Hungarian mercenaries.37
This “new” style Florentine army with its multinational collection of merce-
naries engaged in battle with its Milanese counterpart near the town of 
Cascina (near Pisa) at the beginning of December 1369. The Florentine 
diarist Donato Velluti estimated that the Florentine army had approximately 
3,000 horses and 3,000 infantrymen, including contingents sent by Pope 
Urban V.38 Velluti estimated that the opposing army had between 3,000 
and 2,000 horses, while an anonymous Pisan chronicler put the number 
at 1,200 horses.39 Neither writer mentions whether the enemy cavalry was 
arrayed in lances, nor do they give any details about the infantry. 
The Florentine force suffered a decisive defeat at Cascina.40 Velluti lamented 
that “almost all of our people” were taken, including the captain of war, 
Giovanni Malatacca, who was also wounded in the battle.41 Florence’s 
32 CAFERRO, John Hawkwood, pp. 136-137.
33 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 38 fols. 17r-26r; Scrivano di camera uscita, 42 fols. 20r-37r
34 ASF, Camera del comune, camarlinghi uscita,189 fol. 39r 
35 ASF, Consulte e pratiche 10 fol 5r 
36 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 44 fol. 21r
37 ASF, Scrivano di camera uscita, 43 fol. 35r 
38 La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, edited by Isidoro del Lungo and Guglielmo 
Volpi Florence, 1914, p. 282.
39 “Chronica di Pisa,” edited by L. A. Muratori, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, vol 15 (Milan, 
1729), cols. 1055-1056.
40 CAFERRO, John Hawkwood, pp. 138-139.
41 La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, pp. 285-286.
williAM CAferro
The Florentine Army in the Age of the Companies of Adventure
146
deployment of lances did not prove effective. It is in any case difficult to 
determine how the unit may have affected either side. The contemporary 
accounts of the battle of Cascina indicate that the Florentine army took the 
offensive, and Hawkwood a defensive stance. The most detailed account 
is that of Ranieri Sardo, a Pisan merchant, ambassador and government 
official, who may have stood closest to the action. According to Sardo, 
the Florentine army moved forward in good order, in three lines (schiere) 
toward Hawkwood’s force, which had descended on foot and waited for 
them. The Florentine cavalry likewise dismounted from their horses and the 
initial battle took place on foot.42 Sardo makes no mention, however, of the 
presence of the lance units in either army –even if the dismounting technique 
may seem to serve as evidence of it. The Florentine accounts blame the 
captain Giovanni Malatacca for moving forward in poor order and getting 
drunk before the offensive to gain courage. According to Hawkwood’s nine-
teenth century biographer, John Temple-Leader, the battle was precisely an 
example of the superior tactical skill of Hawkwood, who after dismounting 
his cavalry from their horses executed a flanking maneuver that succeeded 
in surrounding the enemy, whose mounts got stuck in the soft mud near the 
banks of the Arno River.43 The resemblance to Poitiers and English actions in 
France is palpable and suggests that the victory relied on English methods 
of which we may suppose that the lance formation was a component.
But Temple-Leader’s romanticized account, which exalts the skill of his hero, 
does not correspond to the accounts of contemporary writers. Ranieri Sardo 
paints a far more chaotic scene, in which Hawkwood’s army defended 
its position by tossing rocks from local fortifications at the heads of the 
Florentine horses to impede their advance. It was this action that caused 
the Florentine cavalry to dismount. Moreover, Hawkwood’s great “flanking 
maneuver” is more implied than stated in Sardo’s account which notes that 
the Florentine army had attempted a flanking maneuver first, with 800 cav-
alrymen, but failed placing the entire force in jeopardy.
Whatever the details at Cascina and the role of lance units, it is clear that 
the encounter increased Florence recourse to lances. Just after the defeat, 
Florentine officials rebuilt their army, hiring more lance units, now much 
42 “Cronaca di Pisa di Ranieri Sardo” in Fonti per la Storia D’Italia, edited by Ottavio Banti 
(Rome, 1963), pp. 193-195.
43 TEMPLE-LEADER, J. (1889): Sir John Hawkwood: Story of a Condottiere. London, Fisher Unwin, 
pp. 65-67.
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larger in size. The city recruited the German captains Oswald Buvolar and 
Konrad Chonz with 177 lances each, and Konrad Weitingen with 170 
lances.44 Fortunately for the city, Hawkwood and his Milanese force unex-
pectedly retreated from Tuscany after the victory, looting the environs of Pisa 
as they rode back north to Lombardy. The next time Florence sent its army 
into the field, five years later during the War of Eight Saints against the 
pope, the cavalry consisted exclusively of lance units.45 But Florence, unlike 
after the battle of Cascina, relied mostly on small contingents, eschewing 
big units like those of Konrad Weitingen for fear of their effect on forces 
should they desert.46 
III
The preeminence of the lance units reflects the influence of English soldiers 
in Italy in the middle of the fourteenth century. But the formation should not 
be taken as evidence of a heightened importance of cavalry in Florentine 
warfare during the period. Indeed, it is important to stress that infantry 
remained a critical part of communal armies. Their role needs to be un-
derlined owing to the lack of attention they have received from modern 
scholars. This echoes in part the silences of contemporary chroniclers, who 
tend to stress the deeds of cavalrymen, the most conspicuous element of 
the army, while speaking in more general terms about the infantry. It is not 
uncommon for chronicles to give the precise names of cavalrymen, while 
at the same time referring to the infantry, invariably the largest part of the 
army, as a “mass of men.” The tendency is based more on medieval class 
distinction than on overall importance to the army. Class distinctions were a 
fundamental part of medieval society. 
And that infantry remained essential is clear from the undeniable fact that 
the most common type of engagement in which the Florentines were in-
volved were sieges, for which infantrymen were the critical component. 
Violent encounters between knights on horseback occurred and drew the 
attention of contemporary writers. Sieges were usually tedious and it was 
dull. Indeed, any careful examination of contemporary sources shows that 
44 ASF, Provvisioni registri, 57 fol. 166v; Scrivano di camera uscita, 44 fols. 30v-31v, 41r, 
167r-167v; Scrivano di camera uscita, 47 fols. 22r-32.  
45 CAFERRO, John Hawkwood, p. 169.
46 CAFERRO, “Continuity, Long-Term Service and Permanent Forces,” pp. 29-33.
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the Florentines were very reluctant to engage in open battle. The risk was 
too great, as was the potential expense (in assembling a wholly new army). 
The wars of trecento Italy were primarily wars of attrition in which enemies 
attempted to bleed opponents dry economically. Siege warfare also corre-
sponded to the geography of Florence, protected to the north by Apennines 
in the Mugello and Casentino regions, and to the south by the Chianti hills. 
When Florence took on rural magnate families at the borders of the Romag-
na (a perennial enemy) the siege was the standard method of warfare. This 
was true also of war with Siena, Florence’s great rival to the south. The bitter 
fighting between the two sides in 1390-92 was in the manner of a series 
of sieges to border towns. In such battles trebuchets and canons played a 
significant and still to be studied role. It is noteworthy that John Hawkwood, 
the greatest captain of the era, made his reputation for his victories in the 
field in the flat plains of Lombardy, which could accommodate prototypical 
pitched battles. But Hawkwood fought few such battles in Lombardy and 
when so engaged did not often fare well.  
It is similarly important to stress that while Florentine forces evolved in the 
Fourteenth century, the continuities remained substantial. Whether in re-
cruiting cavalrymen or infantrymen, Florence was steadfast in its practice 
of retaining effective soldiers in its employ over the long term, and building 
its army around a small cadre of such men. Florentine officials also hired 
soldiers from rural magnate clans, with familiar surnames such as Orsini, 
Farnese, Savelli –clans that appear just as frequently in thirteenth and fif-
teenth century documents. Enemy exiles also routinely found a place in 
Florentine armies. During Florence’s war with Milan and Siena in 1392, city 
officials gave four prominent Sienese traitors –Orlando, Jacopo, and Nad-
do Malavolti and Bertoccio Tolomei– lifetime contracts for military service, 
permitting them to remain “as long as they wished.” The most egregious 
instance of continuity is the great English captain John Hawkwood himself. 
Hawkwood was in great demand among all states, from the north to south 
of the peninsula. But it was ultimately Florence, by the late 1380s, who was 
able to keep him consistently in their employ, assuring their survival against 
the growing threat of Milan. 
Finally, it is essential to view the Florentine army in terms of the frequent city 
leagues (taglie) of the era. Just as Daniel Waley noted for the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth century, it is difficult to separate specifically Florentine 
army from those of the leagues that the city joined. The association required 
participating communes to pledge soldiers for a joint force. Unlike the ear-
lier leagues, however, the ones of the mid and later trecento were often 
aimed at defense against marauding mercenary companies, in addition 
to hegemonic city states and rulers. Scholars have thus tended to view the 
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leagues cynically, as ineffective in their stated aims and ultimately used by 
participants as a means of diplomacy aimed at manipulating and exploit-
ing others. Giangaleazzo Visconti of Milan stands particularly accused of 
such deeds, using leagues as a veritable diplomatic weapon to isolate and 
weaken opponents. But the leagues were important to understanding civic 
armies. To quote Daniel Waley again, they reveal, like the earlier incarna-
tion, a Florence army that was not entirely an expression of civic pride, but 
reflected also regional military priorities. The point is crucial because Flor-
ence joined many leagues in this period. The archival evidence shows that 
Florence participated taglie in 1336, 1344, 1347, 1349, 1351, 1354, 
1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1361, 1366, 1369, 1370, 1371,1379, 1380, 
1381, 1384, 1385, 1389/90, 1392, 1396 and 1398. The list is merely 
a guideline. The leagues were constantly being renegotiated and changed, 
so that it is difficult to know exactly where one ended and another began. 
The leagues, like much of Florentine and Italian military history, require 
more study. But from the limited perspective of Florentine armies –the pur-
pose of this essay– they meant that Florence continually had men at arms 
on the payroll and with that a species of standing army, albeit not strictly 
a civic one. When Florence fought Milan in 1351, its effort must be under-
stood in terms of a league it made with Perugia and Siena for a joint army 
of 2,000 cavalrymen, for which Florence provided 1040 men, Perugia 
provided 575 men and Siena provided 375 men. The three cities also sup-
plied 1000 crossbowmen, each according to the same proportion as the 
cavalrymen.47After the defeat of Florentine forces in 1369, the city immedi-
ately sought out an alliance and finally arranged one in October 1371 for 
a joint force of 2000 lances and 4,000 infantrymen (for four years) with the 
papacy, Pisa, Siena and Arezzo.48 The war with Milan was over, but Flor-
ence remained at arms, its force integrated with that of allies. The evidence 
not only makes clear the permanence of the Florence’s army, but the deeply 
integrated nature of Italian military organization in trecento Italy.
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